Worldviews, the Problem of Evil, and Rational Discourse: Thoughts on the Framework of Stump’s Defence by Gasser, Georg
euroPeAN JourNAl For PHIloSoPHY oF relIGIoN 4/3 (AuTumN 2012), PP. 137-153
WORLDVIEWS, THE PROBLEM OF EVIL, 
AND RATIONAL DISCOURSE: 
THOUGHTS ON THE FRAMEWORK 
OF STUMP’S DEFENCE
GEORG GASSER
University of Innsbruck
A brIeF eXPoSITIoN oF THe Problem oF eVIl
most Christian traditions embrace the view that our world was created 
and is governed by an omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect 
God. undeniably, our world is also a place full of heart breaking human 
and non-human suffering. The extensive amount of suffering and its 
apparently random distribution make it hard to believe that the world 
was created and is governed by an omniscient, omnipotent, and morally 
perfect God.
There are different versions of the problem of evil. The contemporary 
debate prominently features the distinction between the Logical Problem 
of Evil and the Evidential Problem of Evil. The former claims that the 
existence of God is logically incompatible with a world full of apparently 
gratuitous suffering. The latter claims that, although the existence of 
suffering and God are not logically incompatible, there is little reason 
to believe in God in light of all the suffering in the world. The idea is 
that the vast amount of suffering in our world makes it very unlikely that 
there is a plausible explanation for why God would create such a world. 
rather, suffering provides strong evidence that there is no God.
eleonore Stump’s Wandering in Darkness (WID) is primarily 
concerned with the second problem. As she states at the outset, it is 
highly debatable whether God has morally sufficient reasons to allow 
suffering (WID, p. 4). Her book is an attempt to defend the claim that 
God has morally sufficient reasons for doing so.
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In this paper I deal with the explanatory scope of Stump’s defence as 
laid out in WID. I focus on two worries which Stump’s critics might raise:
(i) The first worry is that a defence is too explanatorily weak. 
A more ‘offensive’ account would be needed to persuade an 
atheist that theism might be a viable and not just a consistent 
position in the light of the suffering in the world.
(ii) The second worry is that a defence appears to be directed foremost 
at believers by rebutting an attack on certain claims of their faith, 
instead of at persuading non-believers that their view is false.
I  will discuss these worries in the following way: With the aid of the 
notion of worldview, first I clarify the argumentative context of Stump’s 
defence. After that I  explain why hardly more can be expected than 
a defence when it comes to a discussion among adherents of different 
worldviews about issues such as the problem of evil; this addresses the 
first worry. This conclusion might disappoint some, but my discussion 
should show, in answer to the second worry, that the main purpose of 
a defence is not to produce conversions. The main aim of a defence is 
to illustrate that the Christian understanding of God is intellectually 
defensible – despite all the suffering in the world. I conclude that Stump’s 
defence fulfils this explanatory purpose. There is hope that our wandering 
in darkness once will end up in light.
WHAT A DeFeNCe IS AbouT
Stump is deliberate about noting that her account is a  defence, not 
a  theodicy (WID, pp. 19-20). Generally a defence is understood to be 
a  theory which describes a  possible world similar to ours containing 
God and suffering and which presents morally sufficient reasons for 
God’s allowing suffering in the possible world in question. A  defence 
differs from a theodicy in that it does not claim that the possible world 
is identical to the actual one. Thus, on the one hand, a defence does not 
claim to present God’s real reasons for allowing suffering in the world. 
on the other hand, however, it does not exclude the possibility of doing 
so either. The possible world of a defence, by being similar to ours, might 
coincide with the latter. Hence, a defence aims at offering a story at least 
about God’s possible reasons for allowing suffering in our world, thereby 
rebutting the attack from the evidential problem of evil. Ideally this story 
should not be merely coherent but also plausible; that is, someone hearing 
the story should have good reasons to think that the story might be true.
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It is important to keep in mind that a  defence provides a  general 
explanatory theory about God’s possible sufficient reasons for allowing 
suffering in the world. It does not aim to explain particular instances of 
the suffering of any real person. A defence accounts for rational belief in 
God and not for a causal explanation of particular instances of suffering.
IS STumP’S DeFeNCe A FAIlure?
A critic of defences might demur that a defence does not quite give us 
what most people would expect because it gives us too little. In his paper, 
Fischer, for instance, presents a story which he calls a ‘spare defence’. It 
is a  story about God’s using a  certain ‘matrix’ to apportion happiness 
in heaven in relation to the evil suffered on earth. The more someone 
suffers unjustly in his earthly life, the more happiness is assigned to him 
in the afterlife (one might think of the biblical story of the rich man and 
lazarus in luke 16: 14-31). The compatibility of God’s existence with 
human suffering is secured and there is no strong reason to think that 
Fischer’s account is false or incompatible with uncontested empirical 
evidence of the actual world. Assuming that Fischer’s account fulfils 
the adequacy criteria for being a  defence, such as logical consistency, 
coherence, and compatibility with empirical evidence, it nevertheless 
appears to be a ‘really unsatisfying’ story.1
one reason for Fischer’s dissatisfaction is that, if his spare defence is 
a defence, then probably many more stories would qualify as defences as 
well. If this is the case, one might wonder what Stump’s ‘richer and more 
detailed account adds’2 to simpler and more straightforward defences such 
as Fischer’s. His suspicion is that the quality bar for a defence is set too low 
as long as it merely has to fulfil the adequacy criteria mentioned above.
A  similar worry also appears to be raised by Paul Draper in his 
review of Stump’s book.3 According to him, certain instances of suffering 
remain hard to explain even if one accepts the general thrust of Stump’s 
argument. Amongst others, Draper refers to worse psychological health 
due to suffering, animal suffering, and forms of trivial suffering with no 
1 John martin Fischer, ‘Struggling With evil: Comments on Wandering in Darkness’, 
European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4/3 (2012), p. 115.
2 Fischer, ‘Struggling With evil’, p. 117.
3 Paul Draper, ‘Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering’, Notre 
Dame Philosophical Reviews, <http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/24772-wandering-in-darkness-
narrative-and-the-problem-of-suffering/> [accessed 03/09/2012]
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apparent psychological impact. I don’t want to discuss these points here. 
Crucial for the present discussion, however, is Draper’s emphasis that 
Stump’s defence becomes less and less likely to be true if these instances of 
suffering cannot be accommodated within her account – even if it cannot 
be shown that they are inconsistent with it. For dismissing a defence it 
is not required to prove it is false; it suffices to show that it cannot solve 
various challenging aspects of the evidential problem of evil.
both critiques boil down to the claim that it is one thing to come 
up with a  story about a  possible world containing God and suffering 
which apparently is not false. It is another thing, however, to come up 
with a story about a possible world containing God and suffering which 
probably is also true. As long as a defence merely fulfils adequacy criteria 
such as internal and external consistency, developing one seems to be 
more an endeavour of creative storytelling and theory construction in the 
light of present empirical knowledge than the well-grounded business of 
providing good reasons for belief to non-believers. A quite improbable 
but consistent story is not enough for showing that her advocates face 
no evidential problem of evil. Hence, according to this line of thought, 
a defence should be considered to be a failure if it does not offer enough 
evidence to remove major obstacles to believing (such as the evidential 
problem of evil) and to convince a  non-believer that theism really is 
a serious alternative to a non-theistic understanding of reality.
If this reading is correct, then I  take it that this critique advocates 
making defences into something closer to what Stephen T. Davis once 
called a  hard apologetic argument. For Davis, this is an argument 
that attempts to demonstrate that it is more rational to hold a  given 
belief than not holding it in its modest form, and that it is irrational 
not holding it in its strong form. A soft apologetic argument, instead, 
attempts to demonstrate that one is within his intellectual rights in 
holding a given belief.4
I’ll argue in the next section, however, that a version of a hard apologetic 
argument or anything close to it is difficult or almost impossible to put 
forward successfully, for reasons pertaining to the worldview of the person 
to whom the argument is presented. If this is the case, then the proponent 
of a  defence shouldn’t be overly concerned with the worry raised by 
Fischer and Draper, because, though well intentioned, it misses the mark.
4 See Stephen T. Davis, Risen Indeed. Making Sense of the Resurrection (Grand rapids: 
eerdmans, 1993), p. 1.
141WorlDVIeWS, THe Problem oF eVIl, AND rATIoNAl DISCourSe
THe CoNCePT oF A ‘WorlDVIeW’
Stump suggests that the problem of suffering is embedded in a  larger 
conflict over divergent interpretations of our world, one theistic, the 
other atheistic. She writes:
The picture theodicy paints is meant to show us God and human beings 
in such a  light that we can begin to see the compatibility of God and 
human suffering in our world. The picture offered by opponents of 
theodicy, on the other hand, presents the world in such a way that some 
defect of mind or character (or both) would be required to believe that 
the world included God as well as suffering. (WID, p. 18)
unfortunately, Stump does not develop this remark further. Her quote 
suggests, however, that the ‘natural place’ for the problem of suffering is 
in a dialogue between adherents of different worldviews. In this section 
I  develop this point by elaborating on the notion of a  worldview and 
reflecting on its role in a person’s life.
Sometimes philosophers refer to different metaphysical worldviews 
as a source of disagreement about a specific claim. Davis, for instance, 
underlines that a  vital factor for an adequate understanding of the 
discussion about the possibility of the resurrection is to take into 
consideration the different basic metaphysical claims typically held by 
those who believe and those who do not believe in the resurrection. The 
non-believer’s worldview can be circumscribed roughly as a naturalistic 
understanding of reality whereas the believer’s worldview contains at 
least one additional item to the naturalist’s worldview, namely God (and 
as a consequence God’s interaction with the world).5
Davis’s suggestion definitely goes in the right direction but I  would 
like to supplement it additionally. Not only are basic metaphysical beliefs 
crucial for understanding a  person’s worldview,6 but rather all those 
beliefs which play a determining role in how we understand and interact 
with reality, be they anthropological, ethical, religious, aesthetic and so on.
examples of such beliefs might be: ‘All human beings have the same 
value.’ ‘The world can be best explained by the natural sciences.’ ‘Nothing 
that happens is meaningless.’ ‘material entities do not suddenly dissolve 
5 Davis, Risen Indeed, pp. 17-18.
6 The notion of worldview used here draws particularly on the work of otto muck. 
See, for instance, otto muck, Rationalität und Weltanschauung (Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 
1999) and otto muck, ‘J.  m. bochenski on the rational Aspect of Weltanschauung’, 
International Philosophical Quarterly, 52 (2012), 63-78.
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into air.’ ‘We continue to persist through time without interruption.’ 
‘There is no afterlife.’ ‘Do not kill is the most important ethical imperative.’ 
‘God is our father and we are all his beloved children.’
A  person’s worldview constitutes the framework, so to say, within 
which the person understands the world and interprets her existence and 
her individual experiences in a certain way: She may take reality to be 
a teleologically structured whole or a mere random collection of particles, 
she may interpret certain situations as meaningful or as meaningless, 
and she may emphasize certain experiences and de-emphasize others.
The beliefs a  worldview consists of are operative at a  rather global 
level for they interpret and integrate the single area-specific beliefs 
which a person holds into a structured whole. Against the background 
of her worldview, a person attempts to order and integrate her specific 
experiences and her individual area-specific beliefs into a more or less 
coherent system of beliefs, thus providing meaning and orientation for 
her as cognizer, decider, and agent. It should be clear by now that the 
beliefs a worldview consists of play a  fundamental life-orienting role.7 
They are not incidental beliefs which a person might change or abandon 
easily, for instance, in the light of new discoveries and facts.
The imagery of a web of beliefs might help us grasp more precisely 
the structure of a  worldview. This imagery highlights that the more 
central a belief is, the more confident the person holding it is that it is 
true. As a consequence, the more central a belief is, the less inclined the 
person in question will be to reject or revise it if she discovers it to be 
inconsistent or in tension with her other less central beliefs.
Imagine two people, John and mary. For mary the belief that the 
Christian God exists (belief b, for short) is central to her worldview. She 
holds b with great confidence (and she has also reasons for holding this 
belief). The centre of John’s worldview, instead, includes the belief that 
there is no God but that reality consists only of physical matter. If John 
confronts mary with the belief that people do not rise from the dead 
because our scientific knowledge and common sense rules out such 
a possibility (belief C, for short), and mary realizes that C is in tension 
with b, then it is very likely that she will not accept C, because it is less 
central for her than b, and because she has also reasons to believe b. mary 
might find John’s arguments in favour of C persuasive, if considered in 
7 See also Patrick riordan, ‘religion as Weltanschauung: A  Solution to a  Problem 
in the Philosophy of religion’, Aquinas, 34 (1991), 519-534. He refers to ‘life-carrying 
convictions’ for the underlying of this insight.
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itself, but might nevertheless maintain b because the strength of her 
belief that b outweighs her confidence in C. She might say: ‘John is most 
likely right if we consider his claim from a purely scientific perspective. 
Then dead people do not come back to life. I am a theist, however, and 
given what I  take myself to know about God, and given my personal 
belief, I  am confident and have good reasons to believe that God will 
raise us from the dead.’
The upshot of this discussion is that all people interpret their beliefs 
and experiences within a  certain framework, that is, their worldview. 
Depending on which beliefs are found at the centre of a  person’s 
worldview, other beliefs are found more or less plausible. mary is 
convinced of her position not primarily because the arguments in favour 
of b are stronger than the arguments in favour of C but because her 
theistic worldview entails also the belief that God can raise people from 
the dead, that is, not-C. Whether mary rejects C relies, at least in part, 
on how central b is in her overall belief set. What is consistent with one’s 
most central beliefs is regarded by a person as a valid guiding principle 
for determining what is true and hence for guiding one’s life.
It is important to note that this characterization of worldview is not 
committed to relativism about worldviews. A worldview is not merely 
an accumulation of subjective opinions, nor is it immune to rational 
criticism. rather, a worldview is a system of beliefs which are subject to 
rational assessment and reconstruction. muck distinguishes four criteria 
for assessing worldviews. The first two criteria refer to the internal 
structure of a worldview, the last two criteria to the ‘material’ at which 
a worldview is directed.8
The first criterion is consistency, that is, a  worldview has to be free 
of contradiction. The second criterion is coherence, that is, a worldview 
should be a  unified and coordinated interpretative system and not 
merely be a loose collection of rather independent subsystems. Thirdly, 
a worldview must refer to experience in general because it has to interpret 
and evaluate the various experiences of a person. Finally, a worldview has 
to be open to new experiences and facts, that is, it has to consider all possibly 
relevant data in principle and exclude nothing arbitrarily – for instance, 
because it might count as evidence against one’s actual worldview.9
8 He adopts these criteria from Frederick Ferré, Language, Logic and God (New York: 
Harper & row, 1961).
9 These criteria are not exclusively pertaining to worldviews. The quality of scientific 
theory can also be examined along these lines.
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The crucial point is that these criteria make it possible to compare 
and contrast people’s worldviews, and to rationally assess any needs for 
changes and adaptions. An intellectually honest dialogue partner will aim 
at observing these criteria in order to recognize errors and deficiencies 
in her own worldview which would impair its overall structuring and 
integrative function.
ArGuING AbouT SPeCIFIC ClAImS WITHIN THe CoNTeXT 
oF DIVerGeNT WorlDVIeWS
Stump notes that there are at least two possibilities for proceeding in 
a situation of conflict among adherents of different worldviews:
Sometimes the thing to do with such a divergence of views is to try to 
adjudicate the truth or falsity of the claims particularly important to it. 
[...] In other words, we could argue through each claim [...], in order 
to try to establish the truth of our position. but another thing we could 
do would be to describe [...] our own worldview [...]. In presenting these 
views [...], we would not be arguing for the truth of our own claims [...] 
but rather showing [...] the worldview within which those claims are 
embedded. (WID, p. 18)
Stump’s first suggestion is to assess the truth of each controversial 
claim. Her second suggestion is to explain in detail one’s worldview so 
that an ‘empathic understanding’ becomes possible for the discussion 
partner. I will discuss both possibilities in turn.
Generally a rational person will accept a claim on the basis of a good 
argument, because she aims to have true beliefs and to avoid false ones. 
Certain psychological attitudes like indolence, fear, or stubbornness 
might prevent a person from doing so, but this person is presumably not 
acting like a fully rational or epistemically virtuous agent.
Psychological barriers, however, are not the only reasons which might 
prevent a person from accepting a claim on the basis of a good argument. 
If the foregoing reflections about the role of a  person’s worldview are 
correct, then a person might reject the conclusion drawn from a good 
argument because she is already strongly convinced in virtue of her 
worldview that the conclusion is false.10
10 my argumentation is to a large extent congenial to Davis’s Risen Indeed, pp. 15-20. 
I found also Jennifer Faust’s discussion on these issues very helpful and illuminating. See 
Jennifer Faust, ‘Can religious arguments persuade?’, International Journal for Philosophy 
of Religion, 63 (2008), 71-86. both authors’ work complements muck’s thoughts nicely.
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unlike the person with psychological barriers, the latter person’s 
conclusion is not irrational. rather, it makes perfect sense given her 
worldview. because her worldview determines what she takes to be good 
evidence, an argument which might strike someone else as persuasive 
might lack any force for a person whose worldview does not recognize 
the force of this argument. As mentioned above, the confidence which 
one has in one’s worldview is likely to outweigh one’s confidence in 
a  specific claim which is in tension with or even contradicting one’s 
worldview. The person is rational in case it does because, given her 
worldview, she has reasons to assume that the specific claim in question 
is most probably wrong.
If mary’s worldview includes ‘God exists’ as a central belief, then the 
problem of suffering must not rationally compel mary to change  her 
mind. mary will continue to believe in God, if this belief frames 
her understanding of the arguments put forward by her opponents. 
The problem of suffering combined with scientific knowledge about 
cosmology and evolutionary biology, taken by itself, might provide 
a  strong case against theism. mary can see this point put forward by 
her atheist interlocutor. but once this argument is placed within mary’s 
theistic worldview, it loses much of its force, because this evidence against 
theism is undermined by the other evidence with which mary’s theistic 
worldview provides her. The standard for evaluating the evidence against 
theism changes, so to speak, because it is not viewed from a  neutral 
perspective anymore but rooted in her theistic worldview. The reason 
why mary rejects the conclusion of the evidential problem of suffering 
is not that she thinks that the evidence for it is weak. rather, her theistic 
worldview prevents the problem of suffering from undermining her 
belief in God by providing evidence in favour of theism which is stronger 
than the evidence, provided by suffering, against theism.
For someone without a theistic worldview, by contrast, the problem 
of suffering has great force indeed against the claim that God exists. For 
such a person all the suffering in the world provides strong evidence that 
there is no morally perfect supreme being. And there is nothing wrong 
if a non-believer is reasoning in this way. Hence, from the same facts 
(‘There is much suffering in the world.’) and experiences (‘I suffered in 
my life a lot.’) can be drawn rather different conclusions in the light of 
divergent worldviews.
of course, the firmness of one’s worldview should not be overstated. As 
indicated in the discussion about the criteria of rationality for worldviews, 
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mary might undergo unexpected experiences which affect her so 
profoundly that she cannot integrate them in her worldview anymore 
and as a consequence loses her faith. or she might be confronted with so 
much persuasive counter-evidence to her worldview that this leads her 
to think that it is rational to give it up. In a less extreme case mary might 
feel the need to re-evaluate her prevalent belief system. At the end of 
this process she might become more receptive to arguments she did not 
consider before and certain claims of her atheistic interlocutors may be 
more convincing to her than they were before. Certain beliefs which were 
at the outer periphery of her web of beliefs now move closer towards the 
centre, so to speak, and hence play a greater role in impacting any new 
beliefs which she may form. The above mentioned discussion of mary 
with John might be either of such a case.
The conclusion drawn from these reflections is that single claims and 
arguments, even if probable in themselves, will generally fail to convince 
a  person if these claims are incompatible with the central beliefs of 
her worldview. This attitude becomes understandable once we realize 
that a person’s worldview determines how plausible she finds counter-
arguments to be. Jennifer Faust underlines this point and argues that 
many arguments for religious claims are likely to commit what she calls 
‘begging the doxastic question’. on Faust’s account a  person begs the 
doxastic question just in case she ‘would find the argument persuasive 
only if she antecedently believes the argument’s conclusion’.11
Thus, a  person’s worldview affects how plausible a  person finds 
arguments against her worldview: if she finds them implausible, it is 
because her worldview does not incorporate them. If this argumentation 
is correct, then it does not seem to be a very promising way to assess the 
truth and soundness of individual arguments against a person’s worldview. 
Since a theist and an atheist interlocutor have, in a fundamental sense, 
a different understanding of reality, they attribute different argumentative 
force to the specific arguments pertaining to the problem of suffering. As 
a consequence, there is no neutral ground available where an ‘objective’ 
evaluation of these arguments detached from one’s worldview can be 
undertaken and weighed up against one another.
11 Faust, ‘Can religious Arguments Persuade?’, p. 80.
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THe role oF A DeFeNCe WITHIN THe CoNTeXT 
oF DIVerGeNT WorlDVIeWS
According to the second possibility Stump mentions, one can describe one’s 
worldview in great detail, to help one’s interlocutor understand it. Stump 
adopts this approach for her defence. The primary aim of this procedure 
is to explain one’s worldview. The question of truth and falsehood might 
come in later but does not play a primary role in this account.
The basic idea is that mary communicates to her interlocutor not just 
that she holds certain central beliefs, but also her reasons for believing 
them; how her worldview structures and guides her life; and what 
biographically brought her to believe it. If mary describes her worldview 
in this way, then her interlocutor has the chance to see the world, so 
to speak, through mary’s eyes. The worldview is not an abstract set of 
beliefs anymore but it becomes ‘experiencable’ from the interlocutor’s 
subjective perspective.12
The objective of this imagined dialogue is neither a  conversion of 
mary’s interlocutor nor a demonstration that the interlocutor’s view is ill-
founded. rather, it is to enable the interlocutor to gain an empathic access 
to mary’s worldview, as well as to elucidate the various interconnections 
within it. Ideally this results in a  second-personal and holistic access 
to the Lebenswelt of one’s interlocutor. The primary objective is for the 
discussion to result in a  deepening of mutual understanding between 
both parties. Stump writes:
[...] the defense will deepen the discussion between the proponents of 
the argument from evil and the presenters of the defense, because the 
defense will show the difference in worldview between the two groups, 
so that the discussion can be more fruitfully focused on the underlying 
sources of disagreement. (WID, p. 20)
In addition, this procedure is helpful for the person describing her 
worldview, because it helps her to explicate it and to see more clearly 
her reasons and experiences supporting the issue under debate (as well 
as any which may not support it, of course). Hence, a defence gives mary 
the opportunity to uncover reasons for her view which she might have 
missed before, and it might also show some of her reasons to be bad 
ones. Thanks to the defence, she might move from a belief based on weak 
12 This second-person account of knowledge is crucial for Stump’s defence. See, for 
instance, WID, pp. 48-63.
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evidence to a belief based upon strong evidence and feel more justified 
in her belief that God and suffering can coexist. Finally, she might see 
more clearly than before connections and tensions within her worldview. 
one might say that the more precisely a person can articulate her own 
worldview, the less she needs a defence to back it up, and the less clearly 
she can articulate it, the more a defence can help make it more robust 
and well-grounded.
one might see now why it comes as no surprise that the main impact 
of a defence of theism is directed at people holding a theistic worldview. 
Whether someone finds a defence plausible depends very much on her 
own worldview. An atheist might consider a  defence such as Stump’s 
as an interesting just-so story but she will not find it very plausible 
because her worldview does not contain the crucial premise that an 
omnibenevolent God exists.
As indicated already at the end of the former paragraph, it is likely, 
however, that the defence might sensitize the atheist to certain issues 
she was not aware of so far. The defence might initiate a thought process 
which could result in some restructuring of the atheist’s worldview at 
the end. Thus, the conversion of the atheist interlocutor is an objective 
which extends beyond the direct aim for a defence. This is not to say 
that a defence cannot produce a conversion but any such result should 
be considered as an exception rather than the rule. It is probably more 
accurate to say that, in such a case, hearing a defence is a sort of trigger for 
the conversion of a person in whom the soil has already been prepared. 
on the level of the person’s worldview this means that some peripheral 
beliefs in her worldview are moving more closely to the centre, and 
formerly central beliefs are losing confidence for the person.
Someone might object that this argumentation runs into an epistemic 
circle.13 The question is either whether God exists and hence no gratuitous 
evil exists or whether gratuitous evil exists and therefore God does not 
exist. Since a non-believer will hardly have any reasons to believe in God, 
she also has no reasons to interpret suffering in the world as purposeful. 
Since there is no such thing as a  bare, non-interpreted, and objective 
stance for assessing our experiences, the way in which the atheist assesses 
suffering will inevitably depend largely on her worldview – that is, in our 
case, on whether she thinks there is a God or not.
13 David mcNaughton, ‘From Darkness into light? reflections on Wandering in 
Darkness’, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4/3 (2012), p. 133-134.
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In his paper, mcNaughton suggests that one way out of this 
epistemic circle would be, for instance, for a  person to acquire 
some independent grounds for believing in God and His goodness. 
one possibility would be to have a  personal experience of God’s 
omnibenevolence. If such an experience takes place, however, then 
this does not constitute one more piece of evidence for or against the 
existence of God, but shifts the evaluation of one’s evidence clearly 
towards a theistic understanding of reality. Given that the framing of 
the debate about the problem of suffering impinges directly on issues 
concerning one’s worldview, and assuming that the role of worldviews 
is more or less as indicated, then there is no use in looking for a neutral 
ground within the sphere of pure reason for starting the discussion or 
coming to a well-grounded conclusion.
This brings me back to the end of Draper’s critique. There he asks how 
we should decide whether or not to believe a defence if it cannot be tested 
by objective evidence like a scientific theory or criminal case. In the light 
of the aforesaid, my suggestion is that one’s personal worldview is the 
decisive factor for belief or non-belief. And at this point, as mcNaughton 
indicates, one’s personal experience of God’s presence and goodness 
becomes essential. If a person makes such an experience, then in virtue 
of it an otherwise merely intellectually interesting and even beautifully 
narrated story turns, to a  certain extent, into her own personal story. 
This might be reason enough for believing it is true – even if certain 
challenging questions remain unanswered.
No doubt, there is a sort of circularity involved here. The question is 
whether it is vicious. It is not an instance of committing the fallacy of 
circular reasoning in the sense of reasoning p is true because q is true 
and the truth of q is established on the basis of p. rather, it is closer to 
certain forms of circularity which appear to be unavoidable: We might 
define a person as a friend if he has good reasons to care for us and to 
take part in our life. It is not the case that a person first has reasons to care 
for me and then, in a second step, she becomes my friend. It seems more 
appropriate to say that by having these reasons to care for me she is my 
friend. being a friend of mine consists in having good reasons to care for 
me. So we have circularity here, but it seems to be a benign form.
It should be noted, however, that circularity is not a feature pertaining 
exclusively to a  religious point of view. It pertains to all issues being 
directly related to one’s worldview, religious or not. I assume this helps 
to explain the starting point of our discussion – why non-believers worry 
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that a  defence such as Stump’s does not provide enough evidence for 
coming to believe in God. The reasons are first, that non-believers do 
not share the central belief that there is a benevolent and caring God, and 
second, that there is no objective evidence available which would make it 
more rational to believe in than not believing in God.
once we understand the role of a worldview for a person’s understanding 
and interpretation of reality, however, we are also in a position to more 
thoroughly appreciate the virtues and limits of a defence along Stump’s 
lines. A defence aiming at more than showing the coherence, rational 
defensibility, and plausibility of a believer’s perspective on reality would 
miss the fundamental role which the worldview plays for the participants 
in this debate. Stump notes, that the ‘plausibility is very much in the eye 
of the beholder’ (WID, p. 20). I suggest that is as it should be when it 
comes to issues so tightly bound up with one’s worldview.
TWo ISSueS AT THe VerY eND
There are two issues I would like to raise at the end. They can be seen as 
examples of how a defence can acquire the function of sensitizing the 
person reading it to certain problems. Stump’s defence encouraged me to 
think more thoroughly about these issues, and I would thus like briefly 
to present them here.
Here is the first issue: Stump formulates two constraints which must 
be in place for suffering to be justified. First, there must be a benefit in 
terms of justification and/or sanctification, which outweighs the suffering. 
Second, this benefit could not have been achieved just as well in another 
way, that is, without this specific process of suffering. Stump writes:
A morally sufficient reason for God’s allowing suffering must therefore be 
something that somehow defeats the badness of suffering so understood. 
[...] on the Thomistic defense, the benefit defeating a person’s suffering 
has to do either with enabling a person to have the best thing for human 
beings or with enabling him to ward off the worst thing for human beings; 
[...]. (WID, p. 455)
The protagonists in the biblical narratives examined by Stump illustrate 
this point. According to Stump their suffering is redeemed because 
‘[w]hat one cares about and loses becomes the best means available in 
the circumstances for finding and having what is infinitely more worth 
caring about than what is lost’. (WID, p. 478)
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If suffering turns out to be a necessary means for achieving a great 
good which could not be achieved without this specific suffering, then, 
one wonders, what happens to people who do not undergo experiences 
of deep suffering? This is not to say that these people will not experience 
such suffering as broken relationships, being disappointed by close 
friends, losing a loved one, etc. Such experiences are an integral part of the 
human condition. However, they might not have the deeply disturbing 
sort of suffering which touches the very centre of a person’s existence, 
like the sufferings of the biblical figures Stump analyses. Consequently, 
it might be less likely that these ‘more ordinary’ forms of suffering yield 
a benefit such as justification and/or sanctification.
one immediate answer comes to mind: one could argue that there 
is no reason to think that these ‘more mundane’ forms of suffering are 
insufficient for entering into a process of justification and sanctification. 
They suffice because they are serious forms of suffering. What is decisive 
is that the sufferer allows herself to be refined through them and feels the 
need for redemption through God’s salvific action. Someone enjoying her 
life and closing her heart to suffering will have a harder time recognizing 
that she is in need of redemption. If so, Stump’s account can be read as 
a variation of the reminder of the biblical warning: ‘Indeed, it is easier 
for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for someone who is 
rich to enter the kingdom of God.’ (luke 18: 25) Suffering is, so to speak, 
an essential feature of one’s way towards a deep relationship to God. The 
relationship to God does not take our suffering away; rather it makes our 
suffering not pointless.
At this point the other issue becomes virulent: one might claim that 
this understanding of suffering from a theistic view involves a form of 
bad faith. It aims at finding a rationale for something where no mitigating 
answer can be given because the universe is blind and deaf to the cries 
of the afflicted.
What can a theist say about this? First, a theist should underline that 
her worldview does not gloss over suffering at all. rather, it takes human 
suffering as seriously as it can be taken. This becomes particularly 
clear if one considers Christianity. At the very centre of the Christian 
worldview stands the passion and death of Jesus Christ, the Son of 
God himself. His passion can be interpreted as the most profound and 
extensive suffering which eclipses any other instance of human suffering 
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throughout history.14 Thus, it would be a deep misconception and unfair 
to accuse (Christian) theism of being callous towards the suffering of 
human beings.
However, taking suffering seriously is just one side of the story. The 
other side refers to the hope for reparation and justice for those suffering 
through God’s salvific acts, albeit not in full until in the afterlife. This 
leads to the following thought: There is reason to think that the hope for 
healing and justice is not merely the expression of a religious attitude but 
it seems to be internal to the moral point of view. Innocent suffering cries 
out for restoration, healing and justice. The moral point of view says that 
this should be so. of course, this internal disposition in human beings 
for justice does not entail that there will be any justice at the end. but if 
one embraces the view that the universe is indifferent to justice then one 
might wonder whether it is rational to care less about morality. recently, 
mark Johnston made this point.15 He is no theist, but he is aware that 
a theistic worldview contains the resources to argue that justice will be 
achieved one day because each human being matters so much to God 
that no instance of suffering will pass unheeded. This makes it rational 
to choose the good and to shun the evil because the universe we inhabit 
is morally coherent.
An atheist, however, appears to remain empty handed: Interpreting 
the human race as a  mere by-product of a  series of cosmic accidents 
which occupies an infinitesimally small section of the vast cosmos does 
not make it reasonable at all to consider our fate as important as we 
usually are inclined to do. Within the universe we are so miniscule that 
the pursuit of our own and our fellow human beings’ welfare does not 
matter because our very existence does not matter. This line of reasoning 
suggests that the importance of our moral reasons derives not merely 
from the moral point of view itself but is also dependent upon the 
interpretation of the universe and our position in it. Johnston writes that 
man ‘should hope that it is a universe in which the cries of great injustice 
to be punished, and the cries of great sacrifice in the name of the good 
14 See e. g. Stump’s interpretation of Jesus’ cry of dereliction. eleonore Stump, 
‘Atonement and the Cry of Dereliction from the Cross’, European Journal for Philosophy 
of Religion, 4/1 (2012), 1-17.
15 See mark Johnston, Surviving Death (Princeton: Princeton university Press, 2010), 
pp. 8-12. Johnston considers this as a worrisome feature of atheistic naturalism, which 
was one of the main motivations for writing this book.
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to be rewarded, do not just echo in the void.’16 Atheism, however, seems 
to be unable to argue for such a universe where moral coherence exists.
Someone might reply that this hope is nothing but an expression of 
wishful thinking, and that if someone believes in such a universe, then 
fantasy is beating reason. maybe this is true. but how can we know? 
What seems to be true, however, is that it is not so much a theistic but 
an atheistic attitude adding to the burden of the sufferers for the latter 
crushes any hope for ultimate justice and consolation.
Wandering in Darkness contributes to assuage the burden of sufferers. 
It presents a world where God has morally sufficient reasons for allowing 
human suffering – at least of mentally fully functional human adults. 
of course, this illuminates only one segment of the panoply of human 
suffering. It raises the hope, however, that the wandering in darkness of all 
of us will end up in light – with no suffering anymore but pure joy instead.
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